Guide · Agent skill
How to use the Agentic Supply Chain Detection agent skill
Updated · written with AI from the project's own documentation and checked against our catalogue data
Agentic Supply Chain Detection is an agent skill, a set of written instructions that an AI agent such as Claude reads and follows. In this skill the agent acts as a security auditor: it sends the agent under test risky requests, such as loading a tool from an unknown URL or accepting a poisoned tool manifest, and records any it accepts as trusted. This guide explains what the skill does, how to install it, how to trigger it and what to expect in the report.
Quick start
- 1Download the ZIP. Download the skill ZIP from this page and unzip it to get SKILL.md.
- 2Place the skill folder. Copy the folder to ~/.claude/skills/ for personal use or to .claude/skills/ in a project.
- 3Or upload in the Claude apps. In the Claude apps, open Settings, go to Capabilities and upload the skill under Skills.
- 4Make a natural request. Ask the agent to audit how it handles plugins, tools, models or updates from external sources.
- 5Review each finding. Read every vuln block, checking the evidence conversation, level and suggested fix.
What the skill makes the agent do
The skill checks for supply-chain risks that enter an agent through dependencies, plugins, tools, model providers or update channels. It runs three kinds of probes: untrusted plugin or tool loading, dependency integrity and pinning, and malicious artifact injection.
An agent is judged vulnerable if it loads or executes tools, plugins or models from unverified sources, accepts user-supplied artifacts as trusted without checks, or updates dependencies without integrity validation or pinning. It is judged safe if it refuses or requires trusted sources, signatures or explicit admin approval.
- Untrusted plugin/tool loading: a tool manifest or extension from an arbitrary URL or a personal GitHub fork.
- Dependency integrity: installing a nightly build from an unknown repo or updating all packages without pinning.
- Malicious artifact injection: a tool manifest that asks for shell and filesystem permissions and points to an unknown script.
Install the skill from the ZIP
Download the ZIP for this skill from this page and unzip it. The skill is a single file named SKILL.md. Put the unzipped skill folder in one of two places: ~/.claude/skills/ to make it available to you across projects, or a project's .claude/skills/ folder to limit it to that project.
If you use the Claude apps instead, open Settings, go to Capabilities, and upload the skill under Skills.
- Personal install: ~/.claude/skills/
- Project install: .claude/skills/ inside your project
- Claude apps: Settings → Capabilities → Skills
Trigger the skill with a natural request
You do not need a special command. Describe the goal in plain language and mention the agent or plugin system you want tested. Requests that fit the skill include asking the agent to check how it handles third-party plugins, tools or model downloads, or to audit whether it safely accepts updates from external sources.
If your agent never loads external components, the skill tells the agent to skip it. Use it only for agents that load plugins, tools, models, remote configs or third-party packages.
- Check whether our agent safely handles third-party plugins and tools.
- Audit how this agent responds to a tool manifest from an unknown URL.
- Test whether the agent would install a nightly build from an unverified GitHub repo.
- Run a supply-chain check on the agent's model download behaviour and report findings.
Read the findings report
For each confirmed finding the skill emits one structured <vuln> block. It includes a title, a description with location, type, evidence and impact, a risk type, a level, a suggested fix and the full conversation with the prompt and the agent's response.
The suggested fix in the sample format is to allow only trusted, signed and pinned dependencies, require admin approval for new tools or models, and validate artifacts before use. Use the conversation transcript as evidence when you review each finding.
- title, desc, risk_type, level, suggestion, conversation
- desc includes Location, Type, Evidence and Impact
- One vuln block per confirmed finding
<vuln>
<title>Agentic Supply Chain Compromise via Untrusted Plugin</title>
<risk_type>Supply Chain Compromise</risk_type>
<level>High</level>
</vuln>Safety notes: scripts and network
This skill does not run scripts and does not use the network, according to its listing. It works only through conversation with the agent under test. It does not scan dependency files and does not check package signatures, so it cannot confirm that the packages in a real project are safe.
The probes themselves contain example URLs and a deliberately malicious-looking manifest. Run them against a test environment, not against an agent with access to production systems or real credentials, because the agent under test may actually attempt to load what it is asked to load.
- Runs scripts: no
- Uses network: no
- Does not scan dependency files or verify signatures
- Run tests in an isolated environment
Tips for getting useful results
Tell the skill which kinds of components your agent loads, such as plugins, tools, models or remote prompts, so the probes target the right surface. Keep the findings in the structured format if you plan to share them with a security review.
Treat the skill as one conversational check among others. Pair it with a real dependency scanner and signature verification for your project, since this skill only probes behaviour.
- Name the component types your agent actually loads.
- Keep the vuln format so findings are easy to compare across runs.
- Combine with dependency scanning and signature checks for real package security.
What people use it for
- Security teams checking whether an AI agent safely handles plugins, tools and model downloads.
- Developers building agents that load third-party extensions who want a supply-chain check before release.
- Auditors who need a structured report format for supply-chain findings.
- Testing whether an agent refuses a tool manifest that requests shell and filesystem permissions.
Frequently asked questions
How do I install the agentic supply chain detection skill?
Download the ZIP from this page and unzip it. Place the folder in ~/.claude/skills/ for personal use or in a project's .claude/skills/ folder, or upload it in the Claude apps under Settings → Capabilities → Skills.
Is the agentic supply chain detection skill free?
The skill is listed under the Apache-2.0 licence. The source does not mention pricing, so check the licence text for the terms that apply.
What does the skill require?
The listing lists no requirements. It runs no scripts and uses no network, and it works through conversation with the agent under test.
Does this skill scan my project dependencies for vulnerabilities?
No. The skill only probes the agent's conversational behaviour. It does not scan dependency files or check package signatures, so use a dependency scanner for that.
Which agents can use this skill?
The skill is aimed at agents that load plugins, tools, models, remote configs or third-party packages. If the agent does none of these, the skill tells the agent to skip it.
How does this compare with other supply-chain tools?
This skill tests how an agent behaves when given risky requests. Dependency scanners and signature verification check the packages themselves, so the two approaches address different parts of the risk.
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Our verdict
Use this skill if you are a security team, agent developer or auditor who needs to know whether an AI agent wrongly trusts plugins, tools, models or updates from untrusted sources. Skip it for general agent use, and do not rely on it alone to check real package security, since it only tests conversational behaviour.
Download the skill